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foreign policy achievements and blunders
La diplomacia al servicio del desarrollo.  
Reflexiones epistemológicas sobre los recientes logros 
y tropiezos en materia de política en Uganda
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Abstract
This article is guided by a triangulation of neo-realist and neo-liberalist 
post-modernist approaches to the analysis of foreign policy coupled with 
Rosenau’s pre-theory and Allison’s models of foreign policy decision-
making using the decision units approach, among others. It seeks to 
stimulate reflection on the epistemological underpinnings of the new 
paradigm shifts in Uganda’s foreign policy in recent times. Theories will 
assist in epistemologically conceptualizing issues and events, creating 
and setting standards and benchmarking conditions for meeting the 
new universalistic foreign policy paradigm or in answering academic or/
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and practical questions. It is contended that there has been a significant 
paradigm shift towards internationalism in the country’s foreign policy 
to ward off increasing political dissent and emerging socio-economic 
challenges in the domestic arena.
Keywords: Uganda, foreign policy, internationalism, political dissent, 
military engagement.
Resumen
El presente artículo se basa en una triangulación de los criterios neor-
realista y neoliberal posmodernos para analizar la política exterior, 
junto con la pre-teoría de Rosenau y los modelos de toma de decisiones 
de Allison en materia de política exterior que utilizan el método de 
unidades de decisión, entre otros. Procura estimular la reflexión sobre 
las bases epistemológicas de los recientes cambios de paradigma de la 
política exterior de Uganda. Las teorías ayudan a conceptualizar temas 
y sucesos, creando estándares y estableciendo puntos de referencia 
para satisfacer el nuevo paradigma universalista de política exterior o 
responder a interrogantes académicas o prácticas. Se sostiene que en 
la política exterior del país se ha producido un cambio de paradigma 
hacia el internacionalismo que apunta a detener el disenso político y al 
surgimiento de retos socioeconómicos en el plano interno.
Palabras clave: Uganda, política exterior, internacionalismo, disenso 
político, participación militar.
Recibido el 8 de agosto de 2011; aceptado el 10 de octubre de 2011.
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1. Introduction
Theories are important not only in 
studying and analyzing foreign policy 
but also in any intellectual endeav-
our. They provide an epistemological 
foundation to answering such ques-
tions such as these: Is Uganda’s stead-
fastness in participating in interna-
tional peace operations motivated by 
a genuine concern with peace, human 
rights issues, war against internation-
al terrorism, or does it have something 
to do with aspirations of becoming a 
regional military superpower and the 
survival of the regime? Was Uganda’s 
support of the spla in its fight with 
the North and military engagements 
and skirmishes in drc that were 
perceived as being belligerent dur-
ing the 1990s an attempt to create a 
cordon sanitaire around her borders? 
Wasn’t Uganda treading on treacher-
ous ground when it sent its troops to 
Somalia and before that engaged in 
military adventures with almost all 
its neighbours thereby violating the 
international relations principle that 
contra-indicates creating enemies on 
more than one frontier at the same 
time? Whenever diplomats and policy 
analysts are faced with such ques-
tions they scan the environment for 
causal factors or drivers before they 
resort to theory. The academic and 
practical underpinnings of normative 
theory significantly support a case for 
a revisitation of the epistemological 
explanation for Uganda’s current 
foreign policy. 
2. Epistemological 
reflections on foreign 
policy analysis
An epistemological case can be made 
for why a focus on Uganda’s foreign 
policy is gaining ground within inter-
national relations, and why it should 
do so. Looking for the rationale for 
Uganda’s policy towards the United 
States as done by Okoth (1995:107-
110) has far reaching epistemological 
implications in understanding Uganda’s 
foreign policy paradigm shifts on the 
one hand, and why the uk and usa 
should turn to Yoweri Museveni to 
reign in Libyan strongman Gaddafi or 
use him to do the impossible on their 
behalf in Somalia. When a scholar en-
deavors to appreciate and understand 
how a small, developing country like 
Uganda can manoeuvre among the 
superpowers to extract a living or to 
enhance its leader’s political survival 
they are clearly within the realm of 
epistemology: the study of the nature 
and grounds of knowledge especially 
with reference to its limits and validity.
For example, with millions of dol-
lars worth of Libyan investments in 
Uganda coupled with the sentimental 
feelings of a government that origi-
nally came to power in 1986 with the 
help of Libyan assistance in the form 
of arms air-dropped in the bushes of 
the Luwero Triangle at the peak of the 
bush war, the nato allied attack on 
Qaddhafi’s troops presented a dilemma 
to President Museveni who resorted 
to making contradictory statements 
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about his government’s position on 
what he preferred to call an insur-
rection supported by western powers 
to overthrow the Leader of the 1969 
September Revolution. Could this be 
a symptom of a phobia about the pos-
sible consequences of the contagion of 
the example? Libya burst into flames as 
the civil strife in the Ivory Coast also 
raged on. Over 3,000 innocent civil-
ians lost lives in Ivory Coast as they 
awaited the great «African solution». 
The African Union, whose solution 
Museveni supports, argues that this is 
an «African problem» which requires 
an «African solution»! As expected, it 
never came because there is none. The 
intransigence of Laurent Gbagbo was 
buttressed by the irresponsible stance of 
the au. Gaddafi has been a beneficiary 
of this selfishness. Each time the au 
publicly expresses support for Gaddafi, 
he murders more of the Libyan citizens, 
whom he calls «his people» - a detest-
able phrase that makes many African 
leaders believe they own the people they 
lead and so can do with or for them as 
they wish. There is no such a thing as 
an «African problem». 
When this author served as a diplo-
mat in Libya in the early 90s, Libya had 
an excellent road network and other in-
frastructure such as housing estates and 
supermarkets. Schools and hospitals 
were by African standards excellent. 
There were tar-macadam roads, pri-
mary and secondary schools, Mosques 
and Health Centres equipped to handle 
general surgery, in every administrative 
division. An average Libyan family 
owned two cars. If the Libyans were 
relatively well off; why would they now 
want Qaddhafi out? A tyrant cannot be 
genuinely benevolent; overthrowing a 
king and establishing a family dynasty 
is regressive, not revolutionary. But 
there is a curiously intriguing side to 
Colonel Qaddhafi: he is neither an intel-
lectual nor a revolutionary. 
To some people, Gaddafi may have 
been a good man in the past, supported 
good and progressive causes like the 
anc, President Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army struggle and many 
others but he made many mistakes 
which even President Museveni himself 
has at one point acknowledged. After 
South African money, Libyan money is 
the next most visible in investments in 
Uganda. But the people of Uganda and 
Libya remain oppressed and deprived. 
Whether Gaddafi outlives the nato air 
strikes or not, he is the wrong man for 
Libya and Africa should facilitate his 
exit instead of asking nato to stop the 
bombing. Africa’s Heads of State and 
governments meet in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, annually and whenever occa-
sion demands, to discuss issues affecting 
the continent but after each meeting 
nothing happens. There is virtually 
nothing to show for all the millions of 
dollars of taxpayers’ money that go into 
such meetings some of which Gadhafi 
has been providing. 
 Juxtaposed against its explanatory 
logic one finds realism in foreign policy 
broadly conceived, and for the sake of 
simplicity and linguistic consistency 
scholars refer to this Machiavellian 
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tradition as Realpolitik for which both 
President Museveni and Milton Obote 
seem to be and have been consistent 
disciples and later gurus respectively. 
Although not opposed to allowing 
for the play of domestic factors in the 
pursuit of foreign policy, the major 
explanatory weight is given to mate-
rial systemic-level factors in one form 
or another. However, although this 
characterization in terms of the classi-
cal divide between domestic and inter-
national politics has a long historical 
pedigree, it does have at least one major 
drawback as a standard for classifying 
Uganda’s and contemporary foreign 
policy analysis. 
It can be argued that this characteri-
zation of the field in terms of these two 
broad traditions continues to reflect 
a sub-disciplinary self-understanding 
of its development; it should be used 
when analysing the interests of the 
various stakeholders in the war waged 
to remove the former Libyan strong-
man Gaddhafi from power as well as 
revisiting the current state of affairs in 
Uganda’s foreign policy. But, instead 
of a standard based specifically on the 
substantive nature of foreign policy, a 
study could proceed from two meta-
theoretical dimensions, one ontologi-
cal the other epistemological, which 
are entirely neutral with regard to the 
substance of foreign policy itself.
President Museveni pulled off a 
diplomatic coup when explaining his 
foreign policy on nuclear proliferation 
during the visit of the Iranian leader 
Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a couple 
of years ago. Being a scrupulous realist, 
the President demonstrated astuteness 
in nuclear weapons diplomacy and in 
correlating his foreign policy to cur-
rent thought in international affairs 
but opened a Pandora’s box. Notwith-
standing the right of every country to 
access nuclear energy for industrial 
development, the vision of a world free 
of nuclear weapons has been articulated 
by many other Statesmen before him 
because of the danger they pose to hu-
manity. The last time Uganda was in the 
news was because of the ‘buffoonery’ 
and eccentricity of ‘Big Daddy’ and the 
excesses of its other sundry past dicta-
tors. Today it could be because of what 
the President has achieved mainly in the 
economic sector; steadfastness in tak-
ing advantage of global opportunities 
to mobilize foreign capital for invest-
ment and towing the Western line while 
reacting to international challenges 
that have thrust Uganda back onto the 
front pages. 
Even though his foreign investment 
Policy is lauded by institutions like the 
World Bank, the European Union and 
the International Monetary Fund, ob-
servers and stakeholders at home and 
abroad criticize Museveni for favour-
ing foreign investors over indigenous 
ones. For a person with former Marxist 
leanings who did not hide his disdain 
for diplomacy and diplomats when he 
first shot his way to power in 1986, 
his dramatic metamorphosis into an 
accomplished capitalist and interna-
tional statesman makes the work of 
Uganda’s diplomats in Western capitals 
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a lot easier these days, but that of his 
critical biographers a bit daunting. His 
effectiveness in international diplomacy 
is demonstrated by the achievement 
of some of Uganda’s foreign policy 
objectives: contributing to the building 
of a peaceful and prosperous world 
through Uganda’s involvement in 
mutually beneficial multilateral trade, 
Peace-keeping operations in Liberia, 
Sudan and Somalia and the high profile 
international and regional conferences 
held in Uganda. His acceptability in 
international affairs can further be 
measured by the high profile visits 
of three American Presidents, Queen 
Elizabeth II and many others. Needless 
to say, the character and international 
acceptability of a statesman is an attrib-
ute of power just like military might, 
geographical position and natural 
resource endowment.
Does this demonstrate the nrm’s 
Government’s legitimacy and its poli-
cies in the eyes of the international 
community? The answer would be in 
the affirmative except for one disturb-
ing setback; international leadership 
requires a blend of acumen for strategy, 
diplomatic persuasion and nimbleness 
which President Museveni seems to 
have acquired in abundance and uti-
lized largely for his own benefit before 
the Obama Administration, Her Britan-
nic Majesty’s Government probably at 
the prompting of the Court of St James 
and the European Union, decided to 
take a closer look at his performance 
in democratic governance and human 
rights. A decade ago General Museveni 
and Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings 
were hailed by the Western democra-
cies as ‘Beacons of democracy’ in Africa 
prompting the exhilarated former guer-
rilla leader to aspire to turning Uganda 
into, as he put it, an ‘economic tiger’ in 
the Great Lakes Region. 
But for a country that is not a su-
perpower, credibility and legitimacy in 
international affairs is based on respect 
more than the fear tigers represent. 
Suffice to mention that Uganda has 
sustained decent economic growth rates 
and enjoyed relative political stability 
which has impressed the international 
community. As renowned Oxford 
University Economics Professor Paul 
Collier has observed, few landlocked 
countries with the political history 
Uganda experienced have made it to 
middle income status. For a country 
that experienced one of the worst trade 
risk ratings in Africa during the terrify-
ing times of the 70s and 80’s, Uganda’s 
transformation of the size and compo-
sition of its international trade is truly 
impressive but the economy is now in 
the doldrums. 
The relationship between domestic 
and international politics in foreign 
policy generates considerable interest 
to scholars. The President’s ‘excellent’ 
performance in international affairs 
therefore is some food for thought; why, 
for example, has the success story in in-
ternational affairs not been significantly 
replicated in domestic politics in recent 
times, some question. The relationship 
between domestic and international 
politics in explaining a State’s foreign 
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policy behaviour is usually not corre-
lated. This is because there is a marked 
distinction between international and 
domestic politics in terms of scope 
and content as reflected in legendary 
diplomat and international relations 
guru Henry Kissinger’s assertion that 
‘the domestic structure is a given; 
foreign policy begins where domestic 
policy ends’. 
In his article Realism and East Asia 
published in the Journal of East Asian 
Affairs xiv (1) in 2000, Denny Roy 
gives a hint when he alludes to the 
realism school’s assumption that a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ explanation of State inter-
ests rather than a ‘horses for courses’ 
approach risks obscuring the real mo-
tives for a government’s behaviour in 
international diplomacy. The President 
has, as the saying in Uganda’s political 
parlance goes, ‘returned the fire’ in re-
sponse to Hilary Clinton’s and British 
criticism about his recent democratic 
credentials. This is not surprising; the 
main priority of national leaders like 
him is the survival of the regime. For 
them realism in international affairs is 
not the same thing as in domestic poli-
tics where national security and State 
interests actually mean regime security.
Different scholars define Uganda’s 
foreign policy differently; disagree-
ments in approach often seem to be 
deep-seated, and not enough is known 
about it by many of them who are not 
practitioners to be able to say with epis-
temological certainty whether it may be 
differentiated from all other areas of 
public policy. What Cohen and Harris 
(1975: 318) pointed to is an existential 
problem which has occupied a central 
place in the philosophy and history 
of foreign policy analysis, and which 
needs to be addressed as much today 
as has been done in the past. The first 
of these concerns the crucial issue of 
what constitutes the particular expla-
nation of the study of foreign policy: 
what is it that is to be epistemologi-
cally explained? The debate is further 
complicated by those who contend 
that diplomacy is to be separated from 
foreign policy (Okoth, 2010:7-8). 
From a practical point of view, 
whereas such a demarcation would 
have been defensible decades and even 
centuries ago, it is not exactly feasible 
today. In fact the two terms seem to 
have become synonyms in the current 
lexicon of diplomatic parlance. When 
people talk of American diplomacy in 
the Middle East or Africa, they in fact 
are referring to the modus operandi of 
both us foreign policy and the tools 
by which it is implemented in the area. 
At the beginning of the us-nato led 
operation against Gadhafi’s troops 
bbc World Service reported President 
Obama having stated that ‘removing 
Gadhafi from power was part of Ameri-
can foreign policy’ but under pressure 
to explain his meaning later changed 
the statement!
While this definitional issue may on 
first sight seem trivial, it in fact goes 
to the core of what distinguishes this 
field of analysis from that of diplomatic 
history, domestic and international 
politics, and hence is central to the long-
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standing issue of where and how to 
draw the analytical boundary between 
a sub-field that straddles the major 
disciplinary foci of political science and 
public policy. Secondly, this issue is also 
crucial to the choice of theoretically fea-
sible tools of analysis, since the nature 
of a given epistemological explanation 
has obvious and fundamental implica-
tions for the types of explanatory vari-
ables, which in principle are appropri-
ate and in practice insightful. Although 
there is a relatively consistent consensus 
with regard to the explanation, it is 
not the case with respect to Uganda’s 
considerably more contentious political 
meta-theoretical issues.
3. Decision units, drivers 
and influence vectors in 
Uganda’s foreign policy 
formulation process 
The consensus comes down to a 
specification of the unit of analysis 
that emphasizes the purposive nature 
of foreign policy actions, a focus on 
policy and the crucial role of state 
boundaries. The following stipulation 
is intended to capture these definitional 
aspects: foreign policies consist of those 
actions which, expressed in the form of 
explicitly stated goals, commitments 
and/or directives, and pursued by gov-
ernmental representatives acting on 
behalf of their sovereign communities, 
are directed toward objectives, condi-
tions and actors, both governmental 
and non-governmental which they want 
to affect and which lie beyond their 
territorial legitimacy.
The decisional unit approach ena-
bles us to answer such epistemological 
questions as who becomes involved in 
a decision, how, and why the decision-
makers decide the way they do (Snyder, 
et al, 1962:86). Decision-makers are 
actors at the apex of foreign policy 
formulation in the Government and 
the Ruling Party. Some are individuals, 
groups of individuals or a Cabal con-
sisting of a few 1980s nra bush war 
historicals, who exercise ultimate de-
cision-making power and authority on 
a specific foreign policy issue. They in-
clude the President as the predominant 
leader at the State level, the Cabinet 
and the Uganda People’s Defence Force 
(updf) High Command. They have the 
ability to commit the resources of the 
State and with respect to a particular 
problem, with the authority to make a 
decision that cannot be easily reversed. 
A matter that is critical to the State, like 
sending troops to Somalia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo or Southern Sudan, 
involves the highest political authorities 
as part of the decision unit whereas for 
routine matters this unit is usually at a 
relatively lower level. 
The Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for exam-
ple, makes decisions such as instructing 
delegations on how to vote in a number 
of international and regional confer-
ences. Uganda’s traditional actor in the 
foreign policy process is the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs established in 1962 for 
the sole purpose of formulating, execut-
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ing and monitoring foreign policy but 
the most visible actor today is President 
Museveni himself, although the Army’s 
power in politics is steadily growing 
(the Economist, February 14th 2009) 
and the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces 
were rated one of the strongest in Af-
rica, a fact acknowledged by the usa, 
un and au that have assigned the updf 
with some tough tasks in the region. 
Kisekka-Ntale (2004) observes that the 
role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
has been rendered domestic, external 
policy being no longer the preserve of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the 
legislative branch of government but 
an ‘invisible government’ by the gener-
als at the apex of the intelligence and 
security community. 
However, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sam Kuteesa happens to be a 
brother-in-law of the President and a 
member of the cabal, or inner-circle. 
Different States have different foreign 
policy institutions but all share com-
mon characteristics that have been 
entrenched after many years of diplo-
matic history, tradition, international 
mores and customs. Okoth (1994) also 
observes that Uganda’s foreign policy 
is influenced not by the masses of the 
Ugandan people but by a minority. He 
theorizes that the turbulent domestic 
environment is the main factor that 
drives Uganda’s post colonial Foreign 
Policies under its various previous 
leaders. Hagan (1987) theorizes that 
decision-makers’s desire to retain po-
litical power means they must balance 
foreign policy concerns with maximi-
zation of domestic support for the re-
gime. But as Kisekka-Ntale (2004:198) 
observes, the citizens of Uganda have 
failed to appreciate Uganda’s pro-active 
international responsibility and mili-
tary adventurism that has oftentimes 
dragged the country into costly and 
risky expeditions putting the country 
at one time at loggerheads with all its 
neighbours and raising concerns from 
the international community. 
Drivers of foreign policy are in-
dependent variables that impact on 
the dependent ones to cause political 
or diplomatic phenomena. They are 
movers that provide impulse or the 
stimulus that have motivated foreign 
policy decisions in a given situation in 
Uganda. It is hypothesized for example 
that President Museveni’s involvement 
in amisom is driven by a sense of per-
sonal and regime insecurity resulting 
from increasing authoritarianism that 
has eroded his democratic creden-
tials in the eyes of the western donor 
community whom he is appeasing by 
sending his own troops to missions 
other countries are not prepared to 
undertake. The appeasement policy 
prompts western governments espe-
cially the USA not to criticize him 
too openly. Besides, the mission avails 
him access to American arms and 
provides his trusted troops with the 
much needed experience needed to 
forestall an attempt by the opposition 
to remove him from power by force 
of arms. Somalia is a failed state, the 
war is still raging on after 20 years, 
hundreds of thousands have died, and 
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millions of people have been displaced 
and become refugees. But the AU has 
been meeting and talking all this time. 
Only Uganda and Burundi have made 
the sacrifice to make Somalia a better 
place. The updf contingent in Soma-
lia was recently given two US Attack 
Drones shortly after news about the 
procurement of Russian-made Shukhoi 
SU-30 supersonic multi-purpose long-
range fighterjets leaked sparking a 
furore in Parliament because the Leg-
islature did not authorize or approve 
the procurement that cost the Ugandan 
Taxpayer over 1.9 trillion shillings.
Who then shapes foreign policy in 
Uganda? Considering the broad his-
torical perspective is one strategy for 
gauging the current state of Uganda’s 
foreign policy. Professor Pontian 
Okoth’s expositions on foreign policy, 
albeit with a strong ideological and 
historical tint, are quite insightful 
(Okoth, 2000; Okoth, 2007). Okoth, a 
colleague in the School of Diplomacy, 
states that the class that wields State 
power, the superstructure, shapes 
foreign policy, further arguing that 
Uganda was moulded to serve the 
interests of British monopoly capital 
interests which he maintains continue 
to erode Uganda’s political independ-
ence because British Imperialism and 
that of the rest of the other Western 
powers, especially of the US continue 
to influence Ugandan affairs in a neo-
colonialist mode. He also alludes to 
the notion that Uganda’s foreign policy 
towards the US follows a definite his-
torical pattern. 
4. Contradictions between 
the Ugandan President’s 
domestic political policies 
and foreign policy 
statements
The non-alignment diplomacy of the 60s 
did not require politico-ideological or 
socio-structural differentiation from the 
two blocs nor did it require uniformity 
(Mazrui, 1967:35-49; Haveem and Wil-
letts, 1974:1-35). Hence the contradic-
tory nrm government’s policy of freedom 
of choice between having a right to claim 
non-intervention in Uganda’s internal 
affairs while overtly and covertly getting 
actively involved in other people’s affairs 
when there is strong similarity or congru-
ence with the regime’s own interests. In 
a speech delivered at the African Union 
Summit in Sirte, Libya on July 1, 2009, 
President Museveni rejected Gaddafi’s 
call for a United States of Africa arguing 
that regional political federations are 
more feasible than continental political 
unifications because they are more co-
hesive and that the communities in such 
federations are more compatible. He 
observed that the committee of seven 
had identified areas that could not be 
handled at either the national or regional 
levels even when regional federations are 
formed where feasible. He appealed to his 
colleagues to adopt a three tier integra-
tion formula: regional political federa-
tions where possible; a common market 
for the whole of Africa; and areas of joint 
or common action that involve coopera-
tion in areas like trade negotiations with 
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foreign countries, dealing with the desert 
(environment), inter-state security issues, 
etc (Museveni, 2009). 
This was a major statement bench-
marking the direction Uganda’s foreign 
policy has taken in recent years but 
how does the President, Uganda’s pre-
dominant leader in the foreign policy 
domain, reconcile his strong dislike 
for domestic federal institutions with 
his near obsession for the East African 
Federation for which some observers say 
he wants to be the first President? When 
foreign policy positions are inconsist-
ent with the regime’s domestic political 
situation political leaders may have little 
choice but to adjust their foreign policy 
to bring it in tandem with domestic re-
alities but President Museveni seems to 
have chosen confrontation rather than 
reconciliation and compromise with the 
centuries old Mengo cultural establish-
ment that has spearheaded the federal 
political system lobby in the country. 
Looked at in a different way, the role of 
the predominant leader with an increas-
ingly peremptory personality within 
the decision-making unit, the ‘cabal’, is 
responsible for the new internationalist 
foreign policy paradigm but domestic 
politics is interfering with his pursuit of 
the cabal’s interests and motives.
5. A new internationalist 
paradigm in Uganda’s 
foreign policy
The new paradigm shifts in Uganda’s 
foreign policy, namely, a departure 
from the nationalistic radicalism that 
characterized post-independence for-
eign policy rhetoric, to development 
diplomacy, active involvement in the 
processes of creating a prosperous, se-
cure and peaceful world is a significant 
paradigm. Noteworthy is the fact that 
in the last 25 years, Uganda has played 
host to several high profile international 
conferences and meetings including the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting in 2007, the AU and many 
bilateral visits by national leaders 
from across the Globe. A number of 
important dignitaries like Pope John 
Paul II, Presidents Clinton and George 
Bush Jr, Queen Elizabeth, Prince Phillip 
and Heir Apparent Prince Charles, Kofi 
Annan, Margaret Thatcher, and Nelson 
Mandela, among many others from 
several countries began visiting Uganda 
after a long period during which under 
the leadership of Idi Amin and Obote II 
Uganda was considered a pariah state. 
This is a significant paradigm shift 
from the ostracization arising from the 
chaos of the 1970s and 1980s when 
Uganda’s foreign policy especially 
under Idi Amin bordered on the ab-
surd. These challenges for which the 
Uganda Government claims to be partly 
providing leadership and solutions by 
participating in peace-building and 
international conflict resolution and 
management, particularly in the Horn 
of Africa, are of academic interest. Al-
though not a hyperglobalist, President 
Museveni’s present policy of active 
involvement in regional policing and 
peace-keeping points to a new interna-
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tionalist paradigm. The re-emergence of 
pan-Africanist rhetoric notwithstand-
ing, as the widening, concretization, 
and growth of global interconnected-
ness become eminent, nationalism is 
gradually but surely giving way to the 
primacy of economic diplomacy and in-
ternationalism. Uganda’s foreign policy 
has shifted from neutrality, passivity or 
non-alignment to active involvement 
in world affairs; taking sides, to the 
chagrin of some actors like the Islamic 
extremist groups such as Al Shabab, 
in disputes and conflicts to which the 
country was not a direct party and has 
already paid a terrible cost in human 
lives at the hands of terrorism. 
6. Postulates of the literati 
over foreign policy analysis 
in Uganda and beyond
Earlier Uganda foreign policy research-
ers failed to consolidate the field in the 
manner once envisioned. Analysis does 
not follow one style or set of ideas but 
uses a wide variety of them and its 
defensiveness within a larger scholarly 
milieu is not engaged with the issues at 
the head of the curriculum of foreign 
policy analysis. A perusal of contents 
of the major international relations 
journals that were published between 
the 1990s and early 2000s gives a clear 
picture: very few contain titles in which 
the concept of ‘foreign policy analysis’ 
plays a prominent role; there are how-
ever many journals that specifically 
concern themselves with foreign policy 
per se. According to Carlsnaes (1986) 
interest in the development of interna-
tional relations theory has grown but for 
the most part with little or no reference 
to ‘foreign policy’, either as an integral 
part of such theory or as a separate but 
important approach in its own right. 
The fpa has been ignored in aca-
demic debates and discussions, or dis-
missed with reference to the distinction 
between the so called system level and 
unit level theories, the former pertain-
ing to mainstream international poli-
tics, and the latter to the behavior of the 
regime in Uganda. A recent revisitation 
of theories of foreign policy therefore 
indicates that foreign policy analysis has 
received comparatively little attention 
(Rose, 1998: 145) not only internation-
ally but also within Uganda. Alexander 
Wendt’s declaration of lack of interest 
is equally symptomatic: theories of 
international politics are distinguished 
from those that have as their objective 
explaining the behaviour of individual 
states such as Uganda, or theories of 
foreign policy. Waltz declares, ‘I am 
interested in international politics, not 
foreign policy’ (Wendt, 1999: 11). Of 
equal significance universally, foreign 
policy analysts themselves seem to have 
become disillusioned. 
As one scholar noted, ‘These are 
testing times for foreign policy analysts. 
At issue is whether their area of study 
remains a major sub-field of interna-
tional relations or whether it has be-
come anachronistic, either subsumed or 
replaced by other approaches to under-
standing and explaining state behavior’ 
41
Samuel H. Baligidde • Diplomacy for development or doom?
in international relations (White, 1999: 
37). In the same vein, Schneider (1997) 
has noted that despite sundry publica-
tions, the study of foreign policy as a 
whole is in the throes of a conceptual 
crisis as well as a theoretical stalemate. 
Nevertheless, the universal outlook re-
flects a disciplinary development which 
has put a strong structuralist-systemic 
paradigm in international relations 
during the past two to three decades 
and therefore also an effective valve on 
most approaches to analysing foreign 
policy. The behaviouralist tendency in 
American social science in the 1950s 
and 1960s had a decisive effect on 
approaches to the analysis of foreign 
policy. Its impact on the institutionally 
oriented research tradition transformed 
its character from being an essentially 
idiographic and normative initiative; 
analyzing particular forms of policy 
such as Professor Pontian Okoth’s 
chapter on Uganda’s foreign economic 
relations from 1962 to the beginning of 
the twenty-first century or prescribing 
better means for its formulation and 
implementation; to one which now 
aspires to generate and test hypotheses 
in order to develop a cumulative body 
of empirical generalizations about for-
eign policy paradigm shifts in Uganda 
( Okoth, 2000). 
7. The neo-realist backdrop 
in Uganda’s foreign policy
There are different variants of (neo) 
realism in foreign policy analysis, of 
which at least the following play impor-
tant roles in the contemporary debate. 
A distinction should be made between 
‘aggressive’ and ‘defensive’ types (Sny-
der, 1991: 11-12; Rose, 1998). To 
which does Uganda subscribe? During 
the past decade aggressive neorealism 
has been hyped by John Mearsheimer, 
who has argued that whereas the Cold 
War, based on bipolarity, military bal-
ance and nuclear weapons produced 
peace in Europe for 45 years; however 
its demise may produce deleterious ef-
fects on foreign policy in the long run. 
This pessimistic scenario follows from 
the application of neorealist tenets, 
especially of the view that insofar as 
the international system fosters conflict 
and aggression such as has been dem-
onstrated by the recent nato attack on 
Libya which, fearing the contagion of 
the example, Ugandan President Mu-
seveni has condemned, rational states 
are compelled to pursue offensive strat-
egies in their search for security (Layne, 
1995: 130-76). 
This is not at variance with the 
Machiavellian strategies the Ugandan 
President and his closest confidants 
seem to have adopted in both foreign 
and domestic policy in recent years. 
This philosophy characterized Uganda’s 
aggressive posture towards its neigh-
bours in the 1990s. The Uganda mili-
tary have intervened on three occasions: 
in Rwanda, the Democratic Republican 
of Congo, and Sudan. Kisekka-Ntale 
(2004:197) observes that Uganda overt-
ly and covertly did this to accomplish 
her foreign policy objectives. Defensive 
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foreign policy neorealists do not share 
the pessimistic and essentially Hob-
besian view of the international sys-
tem, they argue instead that although 
systemic factors do have causal effects 
on the regime’s increasingly repressive 
behaviour, they cannot account for all 
the state’s domestic and foreign policy 
decisions. 
Thomas Hobbes (1914) was the 17th 
century thinker who sought to apply the 
new methods of science and the Greek 
rigour of logic to sociology. In his 1660 
classical philosophical work Leviathan 
he describes power and promotes the 
notion of a commonwealth as an effec-
tive society. He notes that instrumental 
power has the sole purpose of acquiring 
more power. This includes wealth, repu-
tation, and influential friends such as 
Museveni’s friends in the names of three 
former American Presidents. Okoth 
(2007:128) contends that Uganda has 
emerged as a model for US and imf/
World Bank policies in Africa, and that 
President Museveni is an articulate de-
fender of those policies at pan-African 
fora. This is now history: Museveni has 
with impunity flouted all the rules of 
economic management. He has often 
taken angry swipes at his erstwhile 
western donors whenever their ambas-
sadors in Kampala expressed concern 
about democratic governance and hu-
man rights issues in handling demon-
strations against the sky-rocketing cost 
of living in the country. 
The acquisition of Russian Shukhoi 
su-30 long range multi-purpose fight-
erjets at a cost of 1.9 trillion shillings is 
bound to trigger a vicious regional arms 
race which might increase rather than 
reduce international and regional ten-
sion. In the government-owned news-
paper New Vision published on Friday 
July 21, 2011, Army Chief Spokesman 
Felix Kulayigye defended the purchase 
saying there is a need to procure the 
best and most effective equipment to 
maintain strategic advantage. «We must 
create and maintain an operational en-
vironment in order to give the military 
force freedom of action» he added.
The President’s support of us post-
Cold War policies in Africa coupled 
with a pro-Western foreign policy 
stance has been rewarded generously 
by the United States and its allies. But 
Museveni’s displeasure at the US and 
nato attack on Libya’s strongman 
Gaddafi expressed in a missive distrib-
uted to all the major media houses in 
Uganda a few days after the war started 
may complicate US-Uganda relations 
which are never going to be the same, 
as the opposition asks ‘for whom the 
bell tolls’. Hobbes rightly observed that 
the value or worth of a man is, as all 
other things, his price; that is to say, so 
much as would be given for the use of 
his power. He thus saw the quest for 
power as the quest for command over 
the power of others, ‘If one can get an-
other to use their power on behalf of his 
purpose, then he can add their power 
to his arsenal’. The us which has in the 
past been able to buy the compliance of 
President Museveni by refraining from 
criticizing him in public even when the 
security forces violate human rights 
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with impunity may not be able to do so 
in future. But what Demosthenes said 
about diplomacy in ancient Athens, 
which in his days was synonymous 
with foreign policy, in ancient Athens 
probably applies to our age too:
«Ambassadors have no battle ships 
at their disposal, or heavy infantry, or 
fortresses; their weapons are words 
and opportunities. In important trans-
actions opportunities are fleeting; once 
they are missed they cannot be recov-
ered….Thus an ambassador who, in 
a constitution such as ours, acts in 
a dilatory manner and causes us to 
miss our opportunities, is not missing 
opportunities only, but robbing us of 
the control of events…» 
8. Conclusion
Uganda is partly providing interna-
tional leadership and solutions by 
participating in peace-building as well 
as regional conflict resolution and man-
agement, particularly in Liberia, Darfur, 
Southern Sudan and the Horn of Af-
rica in Somalia. If there are perceived 
anomalies in the current diplomatic 
structures, methodologies and philoso-
phies significant enough to undermine 
capacity for solving the contemporary 
problems of Uganda’s foreign policy, 
then there is a need for skewing politi-
cal culture and Foreign Service training 
towards development diplomacy. The 
esprit de corps of the Uganda profes-
sional foreign service needs a new phi-
losophy of work in order to render the 
professional diplomatic service more 
relevant as an instrument for mooring 
foreign policy towards international de-
velopment, responsibility and regional 
leadership. But as former US president 
Jimmy Carter once said, «This is a dif-
ficult age in which to be a diplomat or 
a politician, and a hell of a time to be 
a soldier» (See Howe, 1980).
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